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Abstract
With the dramatic advances in computer technology in recent
decades, the increase of crimes committed using high
technology has skyrocketed. Losses to corporations and
governmental agencies have totalled millions if not billions
of dollars per year. Victims are beginning to speak out and
ask for help. Law enforcement agencies throughout the
country are teaming together to create specialized crime
units and task forces in an attempt to successfully combat
computer related crimes. Nevada is one of the many states
which is in the infancy stages of developing such a task
force. The Sacramento Valley High Tech Crime Task Force has
actively supported the efforts of the Nevada Attorney
General's Office. What does the Nevada Attorney General's
Office need to do to launch a successful high technology
crime task force as other jurisdictions have done? What is
the best, most efficient, most productive method to
investigate this type of white collar crime? This paper
will examine such efforts.
IV
Crime Task Force :
Chapter I
Introduction
The dramatic increase in crime using high
technology has caused losses to corporations and
governmental agencies into millions of dollars per
year. The figures will likely climb in the future.
The reaction of law enforcement has resulted in the
creation of specialized crime units and
multijurisdiction task forces.
Nevada Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa
referred to the following case as the state's "wake up
call" to the fact that a high technology crime task
force was needed.
A. State of Nevada vs. Ronald D. Harris
In January 1995 Nevada State Gaming Control Board
employee Ronald D. Harris travelled to Bally's Hotel
and Casino in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Accompanied
by his companion, Reid McNeal, and packed with several
pieces of high technology equipment, McNeal hit a
$100,000 Keno jackpot on a video Keno game with the
instruction of Harris.
After insisting on being paid cash instead of a
cashier's check, McNeal's activity became suspect to
hotel security and his room was subsequently searched.
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The search uncovered items belonging to the Nevada
Gaming Control Board (GCB) which were used to calculate
and alter the element of chance in a game. Harris and
McNeal were shortly arrested and an investigation began
quickly in Nevada due to Harris' position within the
agency.
The Nevada Attorney General's Office has the
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute state
employees who during the course and scope of their
duties misuse their authority and face possible
criminal charges.
Harris was an engineer for the GCB in the
Electronics Services Division. He had access to
various computer programs submitted to the Board which
are required by law to be provided by gaming licensees
to the division for premarketing approval.
It was discovered that Harris used confidential
information from his position at GCB to find a glitch
in the random number generator used by a particular
Keno program. He used this information to develop a
computer program which would predict the outcomes of
future games.
Harris not only figured the outcome of some Keno
programs but also altered the element of chance on
various slot machines within Nevada.
"Harris did . . . modify a proprietary computer
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program of the GCB, known at the DEPROM, which was used
by that agency's field inspectors to test the proper
functioning of gaming devices. The modification of the
DEPROM program caused a cheating subroutine, or 'gaff,'
to be inserted into computer chips in certain Universal
slot machines -- equipment or devices associated with
gaming -- which were being inspected by GCB employees.
The gaff was activated by a predetermined sequence of
coin bets, after which the gaffed gaming device would
register and pay out its maximum award jackpot. The
gaff affected the result of a wager by determining win
or loss, and/or altered the normal criteria of random
selection, affecting the operation or determining the
outcome of the game." (Indictment filed in the Second
Judicial District of the State of Nevada, case #CR96-
1349)
Harris was also criminally charged with
instructing his acquaintances in the use of a
predetermined sequence of coin bets necessary to
activate a cheating feature inserted into a computer
chip contained within specific slot machines.
An investigation by the Nevada Attorney General's
Office uncovered several jackpots won over the past
years attributed to Harris and his colleagues who
travelled statewide to win jackpots. Harris et. al.
were criminally charged in Washoe and Clark Counties.
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Harris was subsequently sentenced to serve 7 years in
the Nevada Department of Prisons.
Another computer related case followed on the
heels of the State of Nevada vs. Ronald D. Harris.
B. United States vs. Mary Ferris (AKA: Jane Treher)
In August 1996 L & H Administrators purchased
Coresource, the State of Nevada's third party
administrator of health claims.
Claims Manager Mary Ferris was hired to supervise
a staff to process claims. She had previous claims
processing experience in California and seemed to be a
fine candidate for the position to which she was hired.
Eight months into her employment with L & H,
Ferris planned and carried out a scheme which would net
her $608,000 from the State of Nevada's account. These
monies were the result of false claims paid which were
created on the computer. These claims were made for
services from fictitious providers which were also
inputted into the computer.
An investigation was initiated when former
employees of L & H brought an internal audit to the
attention of authorities. L & H had known there was a
problem with Ferris who was no longer with the company
but when L & H was forced to close their doors due to
poor business practices, they never advised the State
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of Nevada.
With Ferris' knowledge of processing medical
claims and access to the L & H claims computer, Ferris
created false provider names and addresses which were
found to be at various rented mail box locations.
Ferris then processed false medical claims in an amount
in excess of $600,000 to legitimate employees changing
their addresses to the mail boxes rented by her. This
would prevent any claims payment notification from
being forwarded to the employees alerting them of
payments made to fictitious providers who, of course,
never rendered service.
Payments were generated by the computer for these
false claims and checks sent to false providers at the
mail boxes. Ferris collected the checks and deposited
them in various accounts she had opened in the names of
the false providers at a local bank.
Search warrants executed on the bank accounts
resulted in the recovery of $471,000. Of the $471,000
recovered, the state's share was $466,000 with the
remaining going to Clark County. Ferris had performed
similar acts with the Clark County account managed by L
& H.
The Attorney General's Office worked with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in this case that would
recover much of the loss from Ferris and send Jane
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Treher (AKA: Mary Ferris) to federal prison for over 4
years. Ferris had previous convictions for health care
fraud in the State of California and was being sought
by another private company in California for similar
conduct.
With the sudden revelation that computer crime
within the State of Nevada was becoming more prevalent,
Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa sponsored the
Nevada High Technology Crime Task Force. This task
force is modeled after the Sacramento Valley High Tech
Task Force which has been in place since 1995.
"The Nevada High Technology Crime Task Force was
organized in July, 1997 at the direction of Attorney
General Frankie Sue Del Papa and is comprised of
representatives of state, local and federal law
enforcement agencies and private industry. The task
force was created for the purpose of forming high
technology crime units to conduct multi-jurisdictional
investigations; track and disrupt the illicit commerce
in stolen high tech goods, investigate and prosecute
suspects engaged in white collar crime, organized crime
and fraud against the government and private industry."
(Executive Summary of the Strategic Plan, p.2)
While the Attorney General's Office has
successfully brought computer crime to the attention of
law enforcement officials and there is an increased
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interest in pursuing such a task force, the specific
dedication of resources by law enforcement agencies
throughout Nevada has been nominal.
Why? Corporations and governments are losing
millions of dollars per year. Why is there greater
interest in the Sacramento Valley than in the Las Vegas
Valley with all its casinos and computerized gaming
devices? What did the Sacramento Valley law
enforcement agencies do to create a successfully
operating task force in a relatively short time? What
can Nevada do to imitate the success in Sacramento and
other parts of the country?
These are questions that need to be addressed in
an attempt to make the Nevada High Tech Crime Task
Force more efficient in their mission goals. (Much of
the information contained in this paper was extracted
from handouts distributed at an organizational meeting
in July 1997 on the Nevada Computer Forensic Task
Force.)
Additionally, what is the best, most efficient,
most productive method to investigate such specialized,
technically oriented white collar crime? This question
will be answered by reviewing what other law
enforcement agencies and jurisdictions are doing to
address this ever increasing problem of computer crime.
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Chapter II
Computer Crime and Its Definition
No single agency or reference can agree on exact
verbiage to define computer crime. A broad definition
which encompasses most of what is to be reviewed will
define computer crime of a form of white-collar crime
committed inside a computer system or the use of a
computer as the instrument of a business crime.
(Computer Crime, Criminal Justice Resource Manual, 2nd
edition, p. 2)
This definition is a broad definition which covers
a wide range of criminal activity. This activity can
be further categorized and while various jurisdictions,
authors, vendors, agencies, do categorize computer
crime into several classifications, outlined below is a
standard one that is generally acceptable.
The California High Technology Crime Task Force
Committee, also modeled after the Sacramento Task
Force, categorized high technology crime in 6 areas of
interest.
1. Computer Component Theft. This includes
burglary and robbery at manufacturing sites,
storage facilities and retail stores. This
also includes employee theft from
manufacturers and theft of computers at non-
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high technology businesses and institutions.
2. Telecommunications Fraud. This includes toll
fraud, the theft of long distance telephone
service. This can also include subscription
fraud, the applying for telephone service in
someone else's name. The cloning of cellular
telephones would also be included in this
category.
3. Theft of Proprietary Information. This
includes trade secret theft.
4. Computer Intrusion. This includes committing
fraud by altering or destroying records.
5. Counterfeiting and Software Piracy.
6. Related Crimes, i.e. child pornography.
(Combatting High Tech Crime in California: the Task
Force Approach, 1997)
The Criminal Justice Resource Manual on Computer
Crime (1989) says the technical definitions in the
state laws also vary. Many states have followed the
definitions proposed in early federal bills. (Those
bills referencing the Federal Computer Systems
Protection Act of 1977.) These definitions have been
heavily criticized by the technical community in
Congressional hearings as ranging from being too
dependent on current technology to being inaccurate or
irrelevant. However, they prevailed and are found in
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the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986.
In Nevada there are existing statutes which
address computer crimes, namely in Chapter 205 of the
Nevada Revised Code. Definitions of access, computer,
data, network, etc. are defined specifically in NRS
205.473. This chapter also addresses the prohibitions
of modification, damage, destruction, concealing,
copying, gaining access, etc.
While these statutes exist in the Nevada Revised
Codes, neither Ron Harris nor Jane Treher were
criminally charged with computer crimes. Harris was
charged with gaming offenses and Treher was charged
federally with theft offenses.
The Department of Justice broadly defines computer
crimes as "any violations of criminal law that involve
a knowledge of computer technology for their
perpetration, investigation, or prosecution." (Dillon,
Groene, Hayward, 1998)
The May 1995 issue of The CPA Journal defines
computer fraud and categorizes it in yet another way.
1. Altering Input. Increasing salaries,
creating fictitious employees, collecting
salaries of terminated employees can be
easily done by perpetrators.
2. Theft of Computer Time. Theft of time means
using a computer system for unauthorized
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purposes.
3. Software Theft and Modifications. Making
unauthorized or illegal copies, modifying
software, or using software in an
unauthorized manner, all constitute computer
fraud. This might also include developing
software to carry on unauthorized activities.
4. Altering or Stealing Data Files. In numerous
cases, data files have been scrambled,
altered, or destroyed by disgruntled
employees. Employees can also steal company
data selling this insider information to
securities buyers.
5. Theft or Misuse of Systems Output. Many
people share printers, and this output can be
subject to unauthorized copying.
(Romney, 1995)
No matter which journal article, text, agency, or
organizational definition is used to define computer
crime and no matter how many different categories each
author can place them in, the bottom line remains the
same. Computer crime results when a computer has been
illegally used to commit a crime.
The overall definition will always be broad in its
general reference. It is not until the matter is
addressed in a court of law that the definition needs
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to be specific. With different courts of law come
different definitions of criminal violations.
Those states without specific computer crime
statutes and even states with computer crime statutes
may and usually do prosecute under general fraud/theft
statutes as were the cases of Harris and Treher.
Prosecutors find it easier to explain to a judge and
jury that a financial crime has been committed by using
statutes that are more familiar and easier to
understand by the general public.
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Chapter III
Economic Impact
Can the economic impact of computer crime be
determined? Several articles were reviewed for
statistics on what kind of losses companies and
governments are facing.
Dillon, Groene, and Hayward (1998) state that
accurate statistics on the extent of high technology
computer crime are impossible to determine because of
the difficulty in adequately defining computing crimes.
The statistics are also untrustworthy due to failure to
report incidents for fear of losing customer confidence
and the inability to detect computer crime. However,
the aggregate annual losses to businesses and
governments are estimated to be in the billions of
dollars.
There is no one, single source of reporting
computer crime. It becomes more difficult if not
impossible to track losses when prosecutors do not
charge under computer crime statutes or end up plea
bargaining cases to include criminal charges which do
not relate to computer crime. For example, an
individual may be criminally charged with a computer
crime but in court, the defendant pleas to a reduced
charge of theft. If a statistician were to attempt to
Crime Task Force 14
compile figures based on final court dispositions, the
theft case would not reflect a computer related crime.
"The resulting economic losses are staggering. An
American Bar Association study found that half of the
businesses and government institutions uncovered at
least one fraud in the year of the study. The National
Center for Computer Crime Data concluded that the cost
of computer crime exceeds $555,000,000 a year and that
the average computer loss is $109,000. According to
another study, up to 90% of companies have lost money
to computer fraud. The Bank Administration Institute
calculates that U.S. banks lose over a billion dollars
a year because of information systems abuse.
Many computer frauds go undetected and unreported.
The FBI estimates that only one percent of all computer
crime is detected. Also, an estimated 80% to 90% of
the frauds uncovered are not reported. The most common
reason for not reporting computer fraud is that
companies fear they will lose more money from the
adverse publicity surrounding the disclosure than from
the fraud itself." (Romney, 1995)
Another article in Risk Management in April 1995
estimated computer losses:
* Computer losses range from $500 million to $8
billion a year.
* Computer losses are projected to cost $200
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billion by the year 2000.
* Computer crime has increased by 260% since
1985.
* Average computer crime nets $450,000.
Computerworld (April 15, 1996) reported of a
survey of 325 corporations by the American Society for
Industrial Security (ASIS) which revealed that losses
by U.S. firms from theft of proprietary data are
increasing rapidly, rising 323% since 1992. The figure
includes losses attributed to bribery, hacking and
numerous kinds of industrial espionage. The average
loss per incident amounted to $26 million, and overall
industry losses in the U.S. per month come to around $2
billion. Over 60% of the financial losses are related
to loss of research and development, strategic plans
and manufacturing process data.
It [computer crime] is also an economic threat.
Estimates of the financial impact of computer crime
have risen with the number of cracker incidents. In
1995, the FBI estimated that digital criminals cost
U.S. businesses $7.5 billion a year, with the criminal
charges ranging from outright industrial espionage and
willful destruction of files and data to the simple
cost of forcing system administrators to plug holes.
That year, according to an annual survey conducted by
the Computer Security Institute in San Francisco, about
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one out of every five networks on the Internet was
penetrated.
In mid-1996, the Computer Security Institute and
the FBI announced the results of a joint survey of 428
U.S. corporations, government agencies, financial
institutions, and universities. Forty-two percent had
discovered electronic malfeasance on site in the
previous year, with many of the companies believing
that the intrusions were performed by crackers for
foreign competitors. More than half the incidents came
from outside intrusions (the rest, from insiders who
abused their access). Fearing negative publicity to
their corporations and stockholders, fewer than 17
percent of the institutions reported these incidents to
law enforcement. The survey suggests that computer
criminals are costing private businesses billions of
dollars. (Freedman, Mann, 1997)
Electronic News (1997) reported that according to
the American Electronics Association (AEA) high-tech
thefts averaged about $500,000, the record being $12
million in chips and memory boards stolen in 1995 from
Centron Electronics in Irvine, California.
"Early this year (1997) the FBI commissioned a
nationwide survey of U.S. companies of all sizes on the
subject of computer security. The survey was conducted
for the FBI by the Computer Security Institute (CSI), a
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security-research organization in San Francisco.
Among the survey's findings:
* Seventy-five percent of the 563 companies
that responded said they had been victimized
by computer related crime in the preceding
year.
* Fifty-nine percent of the victimized
companies could place a dollar figure on
their losses; the average per company was
$401,600.
* Forty-nine percent of the respondents
reported unauthorized use of their computer
systems.
Safeware, a computer-insurance firm in Columbus,
Ohio, estimates that in 1996, U.S. businesses lost $1.4
billion to thefts of computers alone." (McCollum,
1997)
A 1997 issue of American Banker reported that U.S.
financial firms are losing up to $2.4 billion a year to
computer theft, according to a report issued Thursday
by Rep. Henry Gonzalez, the House Banking Committee's
ranking Democrat. The report stated that financial
institutions, despite increasing use of Internet
transactions, have not installed software necessary to
fight off computer fraud.
Computerworld (Feb. 2, 1998) again reported that
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the Business Software Alliance (BSA) expects software
piracy to rise in Asia this year, partly due to the
financial crisis hitting the region. More than half of
the software in use today in Asia is pirated, according
to figures released by BSA. Officials for the
Washington group said they expect piracy will rise in
both corporate and consumer markets. BSA plans to
lobby for stricter international copyright laws. BSA
estimated piracy losses in Asia at $3.74 billion in
1996.
Three weeks later Computerworld (Feb. 23, 1998)
featured a story of a fired engineer doubling as his
company's network administrator and acted out corporate
America's worst security nightmare when he allegedly
launched a logic bomb that wiped out all of the firm's
software, inflicting $10 million in damages.
Computer crime and information security breaches
are increasing, costing U.S. corporations and
government agencies millions of dollars, according to
the Computer Security Institute (CSI), a San Francisco-
based association of information security
professionals.
The "1998 Computer Crime and Security Survey,"
conducted by CSI in conjunction with the FBI's
International Computer Crime Squad San Francisco,
California office, uncovered a wide range of serious
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intrusions. The figures were based on responses from
520 security practitioners in U.S. corporations,
government agencies, financial institutions and
universities.
Computer security breaches increased dramatically
in only one year. Sixty-four percent of respondents
reported such breaches within the last twelve month --
16 percent more than the "1997 CSI/FBI, Computer Crime
and Security Survey" results. In 1997 48 percent
reported unauthorized use, a 22 percent increase over
the initial 1996 survey. If the report were to also
include those reporting only incidents of computer
virus or laptop theft, the number increased to 88
percent of those responding to the survey.
Although 72 percent of respondents acknowledged
suffering financial losses from such security breaches,
only 46 percent were able to put a specific dollar
figure to their losses. The total financial losses for
the 241 organizations that could compute dollar figures
totaled $136.8 million. This represented a 36 percent
increase in reported losses over 1997 losses of $100
million. (Electric Light & Power, 1998)
In light of all the incidents reported of computer
crimes and whichever survey is reviewed on the economic
impact, the results are staggering and numbers are
overwhelming. Computer crimes result in losses of
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millions of dollars a year to various victims and the
losses will likely increase significantly in future
years.
It is obvious from whichever figures are examined
that high technology crime needs immediate
investigative and prosecutorial attention from all law
enforcement agencies.
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Chapter IV
Methodology
It has been determined from Chapter Ill's
literature review that the losses caused by computer
crimes are staggering and increasing exponentially.
The need for investigative attention is immediate.
What is the best, most efficient, most productive,
method to investigate such white collar crimes?
Meyer and Short (1998) reported that results of a
survey of law enforcement agencies revealed that they
are inadequately equipped to investigate computer
crimes. The study showed that criminals tend to be
more computer literate than the police officers who
investigate their activities. The most common problem
cited by respondents was the lack of sufficient
training in computer crime, which means that only a few
officers can be involved in investigating computer
crimes. Other obstacles noted were the lack of needed
equipment, inadequate laws governing computer crimes
and time constraints.
It is agreed that investigating computer crime is
more complex than the standard crimes of homicide,
burglary, robbery, and rape. Computer crime involves
software and hardware that most individuals, including
law enforcement officers, are unwilling to spend the
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time to learn. Smaller agencies and jurisdictions will
have to turn to others for assistance as their
resources are even more scarce.
"Because of increases in reporting, investigators
and prosecutors will have to develop ways to address
these offenses [computer crimes]. Large agencies may
establish full-time computer crime units. Other
agencies will probably designate an investigator or
prosecutor to specialize in these offenses. Many other
arrangements are possible. Police departments may
borrow investigators from other departments to conduct
and assist in investigations. Another arrangement is
the development of associations of investigators in a
state or region. These associations can then call upon
each other for investigations of computer crimes.
Regardless of agency size, police departments and
prosecutors' offices will receive more training on
computer crimes." (McEwen, 1990)
Clark and Diliberto (1996) agree that law
enforcement resources are stretched to the limit almost
everywhere, and management does not want to deal with
any crime that requires still more resources. One
major problem in selling the need for training and
equipment is the fact that most of these crimes go
unreported. Studies show that about a quarter of all
businesses that use computers have a significant loss
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due to computer crime. Most are not reported because
of the lack of confidence in the ability of law
enforcement to investigate and reluctance by the
company to admit the loss and take the blame from its
shareholders.
Clark and Diliberto go on to say there is a need
in computer-related investigations for both technical
and investigative abilities. No single individual
knows all there is to know about computer hardware,
software, criminal investigations, and the law. In
these investigations, even when seizing and evaluating
a single computer, the job is much faster and
effectively completed when two or more trained persons
are involved. Good working teams of experienced,
computer-literate investigators working with computer
professionals who understand the techniques and
purposes of preserving the chain of evidence and are
qualified in the forensic evaluation of the evidence
make the most successful seizure and forensic
examination teams, (p. 1)
Icove, Seger and Vonstorch (1995) also agree that
computer crimes call for knowledge beyond the expertise
of most investigators. For this reason, it is almost
always a good idea to form an investigative team to
carry out every computer crime investigation. The team
approach is not unique to computer crime investigation;
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it is used in all major investigations. But it is more
important in computer crime cases than in many types of
investigations because computer crime investigations do
demand special skills and expertise beyond that
available to most untrained investigators, (p. 176)
Further support for specialized units is cited
from Computer Crime: Expert Witness Manual (1980)
which said in recent years law enforcement agencies
have increased, with notable successes, the use of
multi-disciplinary teams in major crime investigations.
Even more than is the case for other complex white
collar crime investigations, computer related crimes
can be expected to require the assistance of technical
experts in addition to investigative and prosecutorial
resources. The interdisciplinary team approach is
advocated for the effective investigation and
prosecution of such cases, (p. 15)
In the August 1996 issue of the FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, Richard Groover points out that
several states have established computer crime support
units, but these have not developed sufficiently to
make a significant dent in the problem. The high cost
of creating and maintaining such a unit makes it
virtually impossible to establish a full support
capability.
If departments overcome the funding and personnel
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obstacles, the usual approach to law enforcement
careers might need to be reexamined. Normally, police
and sheriff's departments rotate staff among the
different disciplines in their departments. Such a
practice might create well-rounded officers, but it
would damage the departments' computer expertise.
Computer technological knowledge and training must
be comprehensive and continual. Every year, a person's
knowledge potentially becomes outdated because the
technology changes so quickly. New knowledge builds on
old knowledge, and personnel rotation forfeits the
continuum of skill needed to deal successfully with
computer-related crime.
Local law enforcement agencies also must work
together to address the problems associated with
computer-related crime. As mentioned, the computer
field is too large in scope for most single law
enforcement agencies to handle. Divide-and-conquer
tactics offer the only efficient and productive
solution.
One jurisdiction can become the expert on one type
of hardware and certain software, while a neighboring
jurisdiction can specialize in another type. Then,
when a computer and its software become evidence, a
team can work together to uncover the information
critical to the investigation. It took teamwork to
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make a dent in the drug war; the computer war will be
very similar.
In a letter dated July 14, 1997 to Nevada Chief
Deputy Attorney General Kevin Higgins from Sacramento
County Deputy District Attorney Robert Morgester, he
writes the task force concept allows the sharing and
pooling of scarce resources between large and small
agencies to combat high technology crime. The task
force also introduced vertical prosecution to the area
of high technology crime. Each participating
jurisdiction has assigned a prosecutor to handle all
cases from their inception to trial. Vertical
prosecution allows prosecutors to learn and understand
case issues in this advanced and consistently changing
area.
Several law enforcement agencies throughout the
country have formed high technology crime units within
their jurisdictions. Whether their crime units are
constructed within their own agencies or part of a
multi-jurisdictional task force, computer crime is,
indeed, slowly getting the attention it needs.
Law enforcement agencies are recognizing the need
for specially trained professionals who will know what
to look for at a crime scene. The professional will
know how to deal with the crime scene in terms of
obtaining the information off the computer, analyzing
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the information and storing it as to not lose any vital
evidence which will be necessary for a successful
prosecution. The professional will also know what
information is required to be included in a search
warrant.
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Chapter V
Other jurisdictions are recognizing
the need for specialized units
In a brief review of various jurisdictions
tackling the computer crime problem, the task force
approach appeared to be the most successful, the most
efficient, and the most reasonable.
"California law enforcement agencies found that
the most promising approach so far is a task force in
which high-tech specialists from city, county, state,
and federal law enforcement agencies work together and
accept assistance from industry. A statewide task
force consisting of a network of regional high-tech
task forces will provide several benefits to strengthen
law enforcement efforts to suppress high-tech crime.
By sharing and centralizing information, a task force
will greatly improve the intelligence capability of
each participating agency. The task force will also be
a highly visible clearinghouse for information from all
sources. A task force will also improve communication
between law enforcement and industry. When business
people are familiar with law enforcement agents, they
are more likely to report crimes. A further benefit of
the cooperation brought about by a task force is
deconfliction, or the process of making sure multiple
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agencies don't trip over each other while investigating
the same crime or criminals." (Combatting High-Tech
Crime in California: the Task Force Approach, 1997)
The Nevada Attorney General's Office turned to the
Sacramento Valley High Tech Crimes Task Force as a
model which has produced excellent results in recent
years.
A. Sacramento Valley High Tech Crimes Task Force
The Sacramento Task Force consists of twelve
state, local and federal agencies with dedicated
personnel and resources administered by the Sacramento
County Sheriffs Office. The Sacramento Task Force has
seven investigators who work high tech crimes on a full
time basis. Additional investigators also participate
part time on one to two shifts per week. The task
force was created with the assistance of five computer
manufacturers and two cellular companies. Supporting
businesses also provided furniture, office equipment,
safety equipment, cash for informant fees, training and
miscellaneous expenses. The Sacramento Task Force
works closely with the security departments of private
companies, and cases are often directly forwarded from
company security investigators to the task force. In
1996 the Sacramento Valley Task Force investigated
property loss of more than $14 million and recovered
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more than $9 million. One hundred fifty six suspects
were arrested for illicit commerce in components,
burglaries, on line crimes, telecommunications fraud,
financial fraud, gambling, robberies, narcotics and
other offenses. (Combatting High-Tech Crime in
California: the Task Force Approach, 1997)
Those successes by Sacramento Valley Task Force
were largely due to several strengths of the task force
approach:
* improved cooperation among different agencies
* use of investigators who specialize in high
technology
* a focus on long-term investigations
* development of intelligence networks
Relationships are the linchpin to interagency
cooperation. Attempting to understand and maneuver
through another organization's complex rules is easier
if you can work with people you know [within the task
force]. These would be the same colleagues who are
dedicated to the same mission. Further, it is simply
more efficient to build those relationships in a
structure that lasts for numerous investigations
instead of rebuilding another relationship for each
case that is assigned. Fortunately, technology is an
ally to a far-flung task force. Long-term interagency
relationships within a task force can be developed even
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in such a large state as California partly through
periodic meetings and partly through telephone, e-mail,
and videoconferencing. (Combating High-Tech Crime in
California: the Task Force Approach)
B. Other Law Enforcement Agencies
David Plotnikoff wrote in the San Jose Mercury
News (March 8, 1998) that in 1986, when the San Jose
Police Department became the first local law
enforcement agency in the nation to add a high-tech
crimes detail, fewer than 10,000 computers -- most of
them government and university mainframes -- were
connected to the Internet. In the beginning, the unit
consisted of just one sergeant and one officer, and the
focus was on the millions of dollars worth of
components disappearing off the loading docks of the
city's high-tech manufacturers. The unit now consists
of a sergeant and four investigators who are all
veteran cops, with lengthy experience in other details.
Further, he wrote, of the approximately 25 cases
the team has open at any given time, between 50 percent
and 70 percent are component thefts and related fraud.
The team's second largest responsibility is supporting
other parts of the department -- from burglary to
homicide. (Whenever a computer is believed to be
involved in a crime, it is the team's job to do the
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seizure and the forensic search for evidence.)
Thomas Weber wrote in the Wall Street Journal
(Dec. 8, 1997) of Michael T. Geraghty, a New Jersey
State Police detective, who heads the agency's High
Technology Crime and Investigations Support Unit. He
is responsible for policing the Internet, not only for
its role in crimes but also for new techniques for
investigating cases. Geraghty says that while his unit
handles every type of high-tech crime, the Internet now
figures in about 80% to 90% of the total. Geraghty and
his staff face new challenges in investigations,
including the anonymity of Internet use. Internet
investigations also cross many jurisdictions creating
additional issues that will need to be addressed.
It is unknown exactly how many specialized high
technology computer crime units have been created in
recent years. However, it appears that as computer
crime begins to get officials' attention (that is,
officials who have the inclination to react to
increasing problems and to public demands), the
recognition for the need of the crime units also
increases.
The Austin, Texas Police Department created a unit
in February of 1995 and modeled its unit after San
Jose's. The Massachusetts Attorney General's Office
created a unit in April of 1997. The Illinois Attorney
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General's Office created a unit in June of 1997. The
Ohio Attorney General's Office created a unit in
December of 1997.
Again referring to the report from California on
Combatting High-Tech Crime and aside from the
Sacramento Valley Task Force, California's solution is
a proposal for five (5) regional task forces throughout
the state. These regional task forces would model
after the Sacramento Valley Task Force. Those
jurisdictions with high tech crime units created within
individual police departments would be converted into
the formal regional task forces.
The task force approach has been tried
successfully on a local and regional basis.
As in San Jose Police Department, New Jersey State
Police Department, and various attorney general offices
other jurisdictions have found that a special high
technology crime unit is becoming essential in the
fight against computer crime. Traditional units such
as burglary, homicide, forgery and the fraud units
cannot each dedicate their already limited resources to
a computer specialist alone. Thus, police departments
are beginning to realize the need for not only
specialized high technology units but also that these
units must also be available to regional task forces
when called upon in an effort to better utilize
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resources, pool efforts and avoid duplication of
services.
C. Federal Efforts
The National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC) addresses risks and threats to critical
infrastructures which would have a debilitating impact
on the defense or economic security of the United
States.
The NIPC is composed of 85 FBI agents and 40
governmental and private sector organizations.
Its mission is:
* to detect, deter, prevent, assess, warn of,
investigate, and respond to attacks on
critical infrastructures
* program manage computer intrusion
investigations
* fully support the FBI's law enforcement,
counter terrorism, and foreign
counterintelligence missions
** support other agencies and state & local
governments
* encourage sharing of information, technical
expertise, and technological developments
* provide training for FBI, state and local
cyber investigators, and other government
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organizations
(FBI Special Agent in Charge Bobby Siller, Las Vegas
field office, personal communication, April, 1998)
Electric Light and Power (1998) explained the
efforts of the FBI. The FBI, in response to an
expanding number of cases in which criminals have
targeted major components of information and economic
infrastructure systems, has established International
Computer Crime Squads in selected offices throughout
the United States. The mission of these squads is to
investigate violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 1986, including intrusions to public switched
networks, major computer network intrusions, privacy
violations, industrial espionage, pirated computer
software and other crimes where the computer is a major
factor in committing the criminal offense.
DiDio (1998) further explained efforts by the
federal government to fight computer crime. In the six
years since its inception in 1992, the FBI's National
Computer Crime Squad (NCCS), which is run by the
bureau's National Infrastructure Protection Agency,
also has broken up securities and investment fraud
schemes and online gambling in addition to child
pornography rings. It also investigates violations of
the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1996 and
probes electronic crimes that cross international
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borders. Those include intrusions into financial,
medical and government computers and networks.
Holmes (1996) wrote the national squad (NCCS) was
created in 1992. Its success led to the creation of
the San Francisco unit, as well as a branch in New
York. The Computer Crime Squad investigates such
crimes as computer network intrusions, privacy
violations, and the cases of pirated computer software.
In fact, the squad basically investigates any crimes in
which the computer is a major factor in committing the
criminal offense. If investigators find that a crime
has been committed, federal charges are brought up and
the party is prosecuted just as in other investigations
in which the FBI has jurisdiction.
Holmes went on by explaining that part of the
reason the units have been so engaged is because they
each cater to areas larger than their immediate
vicinity. Not only does the San Francisco unit handle
California, it also deals with crimes of an
international scope. The Washington, B.C. office
covers computer crimes that take place in the Southeast
and much of the western United States. The New York
branch covers the Northeast.
Holmes continued to say that although the FBI has
only three offices fully devoted to computer crimes,
each of the bureau's 56 field offices has one or two
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people on staff who are also equipped to deal with
crimes of that nature. In fact, field offices actually
handle many intrastate computer crimes, while the three
units tend to stick primarily with interstate computer
offenses.
Other agencies within the federal government
besides the FBI are realizing the need for computer
crime units.
An article in Security Management (1995) explained
the Department of Justice's Computer Crime Unit has
recently expanded its program to help expedite
investigations. The Justice Department has established
a network of computer coordinators. Every U.S.
attorney's office in each of the ninety-four districts
will appoint one person to keep abreast of computer
legality issues. These computer coordinators will form
a support network for computer crime investigations.
So many agencies are realizing the necessity to
address high technology crime. However, the complexity
of the technology has forced the specialization of
individuals and has placed a tremendous burden on
budgets. Again, the task force approach would allow
agencies to share resources and avoid the duplicating
of efforts. These are efforts that are often cost
prohibitive to some small agencies if they did not have
the option of the task force approach and make
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justifying their efforts more convincing.
Chapter VI
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Nevada's Accomplishments to Date
The Nevada Attorney General's Office has developed
a "Strategic Plan to Combat High Technology Crime in
Nevada." For the most part, this strategic plan can be
found on the Attorney General's web site at
www.state.nv.us/ag.
The Nevada High Tech Task Force was organized in
July 1997 at the direction of Attorney General Frankie
Sue Del Papa.
The major goals of the task force are to:
* Investigate crimes involving computers and
computer components, such as financial
crimes, child pornography, network
intrusions, consumer fraud, and theft of
proprietary technology.
* Investigate computer thefts from businesses,
agencies and manufacturers, including
burglaries, robberies, hijacking, sales of
stolen goods, etc.
* Investigate telecommunications fraud such as
cell phone cloning, and theft of long-
distance service.
* Provide technical forensic expertise and
assistance in seizing, analyzing or copying
computers and data, including expertise in
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defeating passwords, cloning hard drives,
burning CD ROMS, and examination of files
systems or data.
* Provide prosecution assistance for all high
technology crimes.
* Develop and provide training for all law
enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges
in the investigation and prosecution of high
technology crimes; develop a cadre of
certified computer forensic investigators.
* Develop and provide education and training
for businesses and the general public in ways
to defend against high technology crimes.
* Propose necessary legislative changes to
enhance the investigation and prosecution of
high technology crimes.
* Develop and provide resources and funding for
high technology crime units and other goals
of the Nevada High Technology Crime Task
Force.
Numerous law enforcement agencies and private
sector businesses throughout the State of Nevada have
expressed an interest in being a part of the task
force.
At this time, resources are scarce as agencies
cannot dedicate individuals to a long term task force
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due to budget restrictions.
The Attorney General's Office is seeking funds
from the 1999 legislative session for seed money for
the task force. The money would provide for two
support positions (one for the north and one for the
south) as well as money for two computer forensic
specialists and equipment. Investigators would,
hopefully, come from the various law enforcement
agencies which are willing to support the task force on
a case by case basis.
Federal grants are also being sought for
additional funding as well as resources from private
industry.
The Attorney General's Office has produced 2
pamphlets for distribution to the public. "High Tech
Crime: Tips for Businesses to Fight High Tech Crime"
and "Keeping Your Child Safe on the Information
Superhighway: A Parent's Guide." These have been
distributed to businesses and schools in the state's
effort to be proactive on this issue.
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Chapter VII
Conclusions
Carter and Katz (1996) write that computer crime
poses a real threat. The massive losses and setbacks
experienced by companies worldwide, both private and
public, have gotten the attention of administrators.
The economic impact of computer crime is overwhelming.
As new technologies emerge and another generation of
people becomes not only computer literate but also
network literate, the problems will only multiply.
Just as law enforcement agencies have developed
specialized criminal investigative units and prevention
programs for crimes of violence and drug abuse, they
must initiate similar programs for computer crime.
Computer crime units are being created throughout
the country as administrators are recognizing the need
to address this problem which in many areas of the
world has already become out of hand.
The options of combatting computer crime are
limited. The option of "doing nothing" would be
allowing general field detectives to attempt to prevent
and solve computer crimes. This would be in addition
to their already overburdened case load of burglaries,
robberies, homicides, etc. Of course, the priority
would lie in solving the violent and more traditional
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crimes. The success rate of computer crime
investigation would be measured with a zero without the
specialization necessary in technical training and
expertise. This is no longer an option in many areas
such as Silicon Valley.
In an October, 1998 telephone interview with
Deputy District Attorney Alberto Roldan who is the
chief prosecutor for the Sacramento Valley High Tech
Crimes Task Force, he attributed much of the success of
the task force to the funding which the private sector
was willing to provide.
The need for the task force was determined by a
high number of thefts being experienced by the Silicon
Valley companies which produce computer components.
When one single company loses computer components at
the rate of $1 million per week, the need for
assistance is immediate. The companies were not
satisfied with the law enforcement response they were
being provided and agreed to assist in the funding of a
high technology crimes task force. They were willing
and able to provide hardware, software and training to
law enforcement officers on their individual programs
and systems.
Roldan stated that the Sacramento Sheriff's Office
took the lead and created the task force with 13 other
agencies involved to this date. All the agencies had
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an interest in the task force involvement for their
jurisdictions were responsible for the computer
companies in their areas. The computer manufacturers
are looking to the law enforcement agencies in their
area to not only express an interest and but also an
ability to assist them in their positions as victims of
crime. Law enforcement officials recognize the need to
try to keep these large companies satisfied. It is the
companies which provide jobs and profits to the
community and support to them is crucial.
Compare this with Nevada.
One of Nevada's main sources of revenue is gaming.
While it has already been determined in Chapter 1 that
computer crime can have an impact on gaming, it can
also have a major impact on the perceived integrity by
the public. Knowing this, most casinos would prefer to
deny any large losses caused by a system breakdown.
Casinos have shareholders to satisfy and a world-wide
customer base to attract. Casinos, like many private,
profit generating companies, would prefer to not
acknowledge to the public that they have experienced a
significant loss and would rather write it off than to
expose the company to financial problems or admit
system vulnerabilities.
Dillon, Groene, and Hayward (1998) wrote that
owners of statutorily protected computers often prefer
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to handle security problems themselves, avoiding the
embarrassment of publicity focused on the vulnerability
of their computers.
While there remains a large demand for computer
crime units in California where the manufacturers are,
the demand and desire in Nevada does not appear to be
as great. However, it is in the state's best interest
to pursue a task force with the expertise necessary to
handle major computer crimes. More importantly, Nevada
needs all the major law enforcement agencies to make a
dedicated commitment to this state task force for it to
be successful.
Efforts by the Attorney General's Office to
certify computer forensic specialists have been less
than successful. Four individuals have been sent to
the two week course offered by the International
Association of Computer Investigative Specialists
(IACIS). This association offers agencies throughout
the world with training for the forensic computer
specialist and upon completion of the program, the
specialist is then recognized as "certified." This
certification allows the specialist to be called as an
expert witness during a court proceeding.
After the two week classroom course, the student
is expected to complete a series of tests over the
course of the following year and submit their
Crime Task Force 46
projects/assignments to their assigned instructor.
Of the four individuals, only one has successfully
completed the program which certifies an individual to
be a computer forensic specialist. Two individuals,
for whatever personal or professional reasons, have
neglected to complete the program and their time
allowed to do so has expired. The last one still may
complete the requirements.
If the Attorney General's Office is sponsoring the
task force and asking other agencies to contribute time
and other resources to this task force, the office
should also be willing to contribute resources. This
would include assuring that individuals who are sent by
the office to certification training complete the
commitment of the program with the full support of the
office. That is, to allow the employees the time to
complete their projects and to purchase the equipment
necessary to do so.
Without the completed certification, the training
has become useless and valuable training dollars have
been wasted. (It is doubtful that the attorney
general, herself, knows the certification status of the
staff.)
As cited throughout this paper, numerous
references have supported the need for specialized
crime units or task forces. While assistance and
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support from the National Infrastructure Protection
Center and the local FBI office has always been
available (as stated on p. 32) on a case by case basis,
funding remains a number one problem.
The vision of seed money funding still has a hope,
however minute, that the 1999 legislative session will
provide a budget for the Nevada High Technology Crime
Task Force. The 1999 legislature will soon determine
the level of priority high technology crime has in the
State of Nevada.
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